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ERIC DIETRICH 
SEMANTICS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL 
PARADIGM IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
ABSTRACT. There is a prevalent notion among cognitive scientists and philosophers 
of mind that computers are merely formal symbol manipulators; performing the actions 
they do solely on the basis of the syntactic properties of the symbols they manipulate. 
This view of computers has allowed some philosophers to divorce semantics· from 
computational explanations. Semantic content, then, becomes something one adds to 
computational explanations to get psychological explanations. Other philosophers, such 
as Stephen Stich, have taken a stronger view, advocating doing away with semantics 
entirely. This paper argues that a correct account of computation requires us to 
attribute content to computational processes in order to explain which functions are 
being computed. This entails that computational psychology must countenance mental 
representations. Since anti-semantic positions are incompatible with computational 
psychology thus construed, they ought to be rejected. Lastly, I argue that in an 
important sense, computers are not formal symbol manipulators. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science (1983), Stephen Stich 
argues that there is no scientifically respectable method for attributing 
semantic content to psychological states. Because of this, he advocates 
the radical position of rejecting semantics and semantically interpreted 
states (such as propositional a~itudes)from cognitive psych()logy. 
Cognitive psychologists, on his view, ought to construe cognitive 
processes purely syntactically~ If Stich is correct, future cognitive 
scientists will have theories that do not countenance mental states with 
content, i.e., t~eories that do not countenance mental representations. 
For philosophers such as Fodor and Pylyshyn, who advocate 
representational theories of the mind, this would be catastrophic.1 
Stich's view, however, is much more sweeping than it first appears. 
If he is correct, then ·not only will··representatioIial theories have to be 
rejected, but, I claim, all of computationalism will have to be rejected 
. as well, because computationalism· - the thesis that cognitive capaci-
ties are best explained in terms of capacities to compute certain 
functions - requires us to posit and semantically interpret mental states 
and mental processes. A success for Stich is thus much more than a 
disaster for Fodor and Pylyshyn. Rejecting computationalism would 
affect all of cognitive psychology. Psychologists in fields as diverse as 
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problem solving, perception, imagery, memory, language understand-
ing, and developmental psychology would have to completely change 
their methodology.2 
In this paper I will argue that computationalism does in fact require 
us to posit and interpret mental states and structures, and I will pres~nt 
a strategy for doing this, the "computational strategy". This strategy is 
used in both the computational and cognitive sciences. In practice, 
therefore, computer and cognitive scientists attribute semantic content 
in the course of producing scientific explanations. (In my opinion, this 
is a good prima facie reason for being skeptical about arguments such 
as Stich's.) I will argue that the computational strategy is used because 
it provides cognitive scientists with a scientifically respectable method 
for attributing contents of computational, psychological states. If my 
argument is correct, then there are good reasons for embracing 
. semantics and remaining computationalists, and we may reject current 
arguments to the contrary. 
My view, however, is also more sweeping than it first appears. The 
necessity of semantic attribution within the computational paradigm is 
not generally acknowledged. The main reason for this, I think, is that 
computers themselves are widely regarded as formal symbol manipu-
lators or syntax machines, manipulating symbols independently of 
their content. If my argument is correct, then to understand computers 
we must ascribe contents to their internal functioning. This means that 
computers cannot be understood as formal symbol manipulators. 
Therefore, in my view, not only is Stich wrong in claiming that there is 
no scientifically respectable method for. assigning contents to mental 
states, but the dominant view of computers is also in error.3 
In Section 2, I . present two of the problems Stich sees for coun-
tenancing representational mental states. My primary concern is not 
these problems per se, but rather the general intuition they are 
intended to foster that semantic attribution is scientifically suspect. My 
arguments that semantic attribution is scientifically respectable and 
necessary for computationalism is presented in Section 3. Finally, in 
Section 4., I discuss the consequences of my argument for the view 
that computers are formal symbol manipulators. 
2. 
Stich sees two fundamental problems with attributing semantics to 
mental states. The first is that a scientific psychology must generalize 
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over contents ascribed to mental states. This requires picking out 
identical contents across individual subjects or systems. But according 
to Stich, there simply is no viable notion of content identity; rath.er, 
contents are more or less similar (1983, pp. 85-87). Moreover, Stich 
claims that judging contents to be similar essentially involves the 
person doing the judging and the context in which the judg~~nts are 
made. This makes such judgments so vague and context sensitive that 
they will not support scientific theorizing (pp. 128-148). Hence, we 
ought to forego ascribing semantic contents to subjects. . 
The second problem Stich sees is that in the case of a particular 
subject or system, the referential compone.nts of the se~antic contents 
attributed to it will depend on causal relations between It and external 
referents. Changing external referents changes the content ascribed to 
the subject. However, such changes need not (and typically will not) 
change the states· and processes of the subject that ar~ relevant t~ 
psychology. Hence, it cannot be the case that referential content. IS 
important to psychology. Again therefore, we ought to forego ascnb-
ing semantic contents to subjects (1983, pp. 164-170).4 
Each of these problems can be construed as an argument that a 
certain strategy for semantic attribution is inadequate for scientific 
psychology. I will call the strategy associated with the first problem the 
similarity strate·gy, and the strategy associated with the second problem 
the causal strategy. 
A. Problems with the SimilaritY Strategy 
The similarity strategy is the strategy Stich claims we use in our folk 
psychology and everyday ascriptions of content (1983, pp. 73-110). 
On Stich's view, when we ordinarily attribute content to the mental 
states of others we compare them to ourselves, exercising a sort of 
'empathic' capaCity. This comparison amounts to the claim that ano-
ther is in a mental state similar· to one which would normally be the 
central cause of our assertion of the content sentence. We would think 
that someone else is in a mental state similar to one we might have if 
we judge that person's circumstances, networks of beliefs and desires, 
and specific behavior in the circumstances to be· similar to our own. 
Thus if someone's situation and mental life seems similar to our own, 
then we can successfully ascribe contents to his or her mental states by 
comparing them to ones we might have were we in his or her situation 
(1983, and 1982).5 
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To attribute content in this way we have to understand,at least 
partially, the other individual and his or her situation. Hence, we 
cannot consider subjects nor their mental states in isolation. Instead, 
we must consider the entire subject, its network of interconnected 
mental states, the set of circumstances in which it finds itself, and the 
context in which we are making the attribution. Stich discusses this 
understanding at length (1982, 1983). He argues that it resolves into . 
various kinds of similarity judgments. These judgements assess the 
similarity between the mental contents of the subject and the ascriber 
along certain dimensions, the main ones being functional similarity, or 
similarity of causal potential, ideological similarity, and similarity of 
reference (pp. 88-90).6 
According to Stich, the dependence of content ascription on 
similarity judgments (and ~empathic' or 'projective' understanding, in 
general) explains an interesting phenomenon of our everyday ascrip-
tions of mental content: as subjects become less and less' like us, or as 
the situations of subjects become less and less like those of our 
everyday experience, we become less and less able to attribute beliefs 
or other content-full mental states to them (1983). Stich provides 
several interesting examples of humans who are so different from us 
that we cannot comfortably ascribe contents to their mental states 
using the similarity strategy. This does indeed suggest that in our 
ordinary life we use something like the similarity strategy to ascribe 
contents to mental states. Unfortunately, the similarity strategy cannot 
be used to scientifically ascribe content, and hence should not be used 
in psychology, or so Stich argues (1983). ' 
Consider the nature of similarity judgments. Judging that X is 
similar to Y is always context dependent and relative to the one 'who is 
doing the judging. Acco'rding to Stich, context dependency and 
.observer relativity make similarity judgments inappropriate for psy-
chology beca~e whether a given psychological generalization applies 
shoul.d not depend on the theorist doing the research or on the setting 
the theorist is in (1983, footnote p. 139). If psychologists were to use 
the similarity strategy then they would be hindered in their efforts to 
develop psychological theories of very young children, primitive peo-
ples, and victims of strokes, retardation, and schizophrenia, none of 
whom are similar enough to the psychologists themselves for semantic 
content to be successfully ascribed. The science of psychology, as 
opposed to our folk psychology, should apply to all humans, not just 
ones like us. 
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The conclusion is that· the similarity strategy for ascribing contents 
to mental states is inadequate for use in scientific psychology. Though 
the strategy. may be used in our. folk psychology and day-to-day 
judgments, it cannot work in our scientific psychology. 
B. Problems with the Causal Strategy 
Stich's second argument is that some components of semantic contents 
(e.g., the referential ones) essentially depend on causal relationships 
disallowed by the autonomy principle. According to Stich, the 
autonomy principle is so fundamental that it cannot be rejected, hence 
semantics must be rejected, along with all psychological theories that 
ascribe semantic content to mental states. 
The autonomy principle claims that "states and processes that ought 
to be of concern to the psychologist are those that supervene [ only] on 
the current, internal, physical state of the organism" (1983, p. 164).7 
This entails that "any differences between organisms which do not 
manifest themselves as differences in their current, internal, physical 
slates ought to be ignored by a psychological theory" (p. 164). 
Consequently, if some aspect of a subject's environment on history 
might have been different without affecting its internal states, then 
that aspect is psychologically irrelevant (pp. 164-165). 
Evidently,. referential components in semantic interpretations of 
mental states are just the kind of environmental aspect rendered 
psychologically irrelevant by the autonomy principle. To make this 
plausible, consider this example (due to Stich, 1978). Imagine that I 
had an exact duplicate made of me yesterday. According to the 
autonomy principle, all psychologically adequate theories will posit 
'properties and relations that are true of both me and my duplicate, 
since we are. physically identical. Moreover, only properties and rela-
tions true of the both of us . are genuine, explanatorily useful psy-
chological properties and relations.' (Stich says, "If the principle is to 
be observed, then the only properties and relations that may legiti-
mately play a role in explanatory psychological theories are the 
properties and relations that a subject and its replica will share" 
(1978).) 
By definition, my duplicate and I share physical descriptions of our 
internal mental states. However, we do not share semantic descrip-
tions of our internal states. I have a mental state referring to my 
deceased gr~at-grandmother because (assuming a causal theory of 
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reference, as Stich does) I have had the right kind of causal relation to 
her. However, my duplicate (let us suppose) has not had the right sort' 
of causal relation. My duplicate, therefore, has no mental states 
referring to her. Hence, our mental states differ semantically (precisely 
in our referential components). It is clear to Stich, however, that this 
difference doesn't make a difference. psychologically; whatever 
behaviors I have, my duplicate will also have. Sharing physical de-
scriptions of our internal states but not seman tical descriptions means 
t hat the semantic descriptions do not manifest themselves as 
differences in our physical, internal states. It follows from this and the 
autonomy principle that semantic descriptions of mental states are 
otiose from the perspective of cognitive psychology. 
Since the causal strategy depends on psychologically irrelevant 
causal relations, the attributions themselves must be psychologically 
irrelevant. As cognitive scientists, we simply ought to avoid making 
them. 
C. The Inadequacy of Semantic Attribution 
Taken together, the problems with the two strategies make question-
able the goal of scientifically attributing semantics to mental states. On 
the one hand, we cannot use the strategy from our folk psychology, 
because when using this strategy, we search for'similarities between 
ourselves and others, and this prevents us from being able to success-
fully attribute content to those significantly different from us. On the 
other hand, one of the best theory-driven approaches to semantic 
attribution (the causal strategy) will not do either because the under-
lying theory (the causal theory of reference) postulates relationships 
between subjects and the world that are irrelevant to psychology.s 
Hence, even if our subjects are identical replicas of us, we still have 
no guarantee that we will be able to attribute semantic contents 
because our replicas may not. be embedded in the world the ~ay' we 
are. 
All this suggests that semantic attribution is successful only when 
applied in ordinary settings to subjects like us. But a scientific enter- . 
prise should not be so idiosyncratic. Hence, semantic attribution is 
scientifically disreputable. This is not to claim that semantic attribu-
tion is completely disreputable. It does have a role in our ordinary, 
day-to-day lives because it helps us understand (though not 
I-~~-~-----~--·-·- --
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scientifically) most of the humans we come in contact w~t~. Semantic 
content and semantic attribution emerge, then, as heunstlc methods 
we use in our ordinary lives to get along with ordinary people like us. 
As Stich says: "As I see it, the notion of ·content' ... despite all i~s 
utility in the workaday business of dealing with our f~lIow creat~res.' IS 
simply out of place when our goal is the constructIOn of a sCientific 
theory about the mechanisms underlying behavior" (1983, pp. 5-6). 
3. 
The failure of the two strategies discussed in Section 2 suggests that 
semantic content itself is scientifically otiose. Neither strategy is used 
in the cognitive sciences, yet our psychological theories often explain 
our subjects' behavior. Hence, content (together with semantic attri-
bution) must not be required for scientific psychology (d., Stich 1983, 
p.208).9 
We cannot accept this conclusion without giving up com-
putationalism, the most successful paradigm cognitive psychology has 
ever embraced. Such a costly methodological shift could be avoided if 
we could find a strategy for semantic attribution that allowed us to 
attribute contents to subjects very different from us, and one that tied 
semantic descriptions of subjects' internal states to physical descrip-
tions of their states (thus adhering to the autonomy principle). Meeting 
both of these objectives would make semantic attribution scientifically 
respectable because it would free semantic attribution from the 
idiosyncrasies of the ascribers (though not necessarily from their 
scientific goals), and make the attribution depend on the subjects and 
their relation to their environment. 
Such a strategy exists, and in fact is used today in the computational 
and cognitive sciences. I call this strategy the computational strategy. 
The computational strategy allows one to ascribe contents to another's 
mental states based on what function would explain the other's 
behavior and psychological capacities. This strategy relies on the fact 
that explanatory pres$ures license the ascription of certain contents 
and not others, just as such pressures license scientific explanations in 
general. 
The computational strategy doesn't require us, as theorists, to be 
similar in any way to those to whom we are ascribing contents (this is 
. why it is' successfully used by computer scientists, for example). It also 
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respects seman tical differences between subjeCts precisely where the 
autonomy principle dictates it should. Finally, if the cQmputational 
strategy is not used when attributing semantic ~ontent to a subject, 
then we will not be able to devise any computational theory for that 
subject or subjects of its type. This last point is strong. It entails first 
that an explanation of a cognitive capacity cannot be a computational 
explanation if is does not posit representations and proc~sses i?terllal 
to the subject, and attributes content to them. Second, It entails that 
we must use the computational strategy if we are to understand a 
subject as computing functions. The rest of this section is devoted to 
defending these claims. 
A. The Computational Strategy 
The goal of the computational strategy is to attribute to a subject or 
physical system, S, the computation of a certain function, F . . To do 
this it must be determined (or assumed) that S executes F, and It must 
be 'determined how S executes F. The computational strategy is 
successful when it is possible to explain S's computation of F in 
terms of a sequence of functions (gh"" gn) such that (1). F = 
gn 0 &a-I 0 ••• 0 gl; (2) S passes through a sequence of states where each 
state corresponds to either the domain or range of one of the 8; 's, and 
each state between the first and final states is the range of some 8; and 
the domain of some 8;+1; and (3) we antecedently understand the 
individual g; 's (see Figure 1).· When F = g,. 0 .8n-l 0 ••• 0 81 and the 8; 's 
are nontrivial it is natural to say that the sequence of functions 
<it, ... , g,.} analyzes the capacity of S to compute F (see Cummins 
1975 and 1983, pp. 28-44)}O ' 
. ;Completing steps 1, 2, and 3 (Le., determining that S computes F 
and that 'F = g,. 0 &a-I 0 ••• 0 81 where we antecedently understand the 
8; 's) is generally quite difficult and always a matter of creative problem 
solving. A theory of how steps 1, 2,· and 3 are accomplished would 
therefore require a theory of how humans creatively solve problems, 
i.e., how humans come to see systems as executing F instead of E, and 
why' F, say, provides a better explanation than E. To date, there are 
no theories of creative problem solving that can adequately address 
these issues (but see Dietrich and Fields, 1986). Something can, 
however, be said about steps 1, 2, and 3. 
F is a "system-sized" function. Fixing F for a particular system is 
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seeing S as doing something regular. Therefore, fixing F grossly, but 
not trivially, answers the question "What is S doing"? 
The necessity of semantic attribution begins with the specification of 
F. If we choose, we could refuse to interpret F's inputs and outputs, 
and instead specify F at the level of physical regularities. But doing 
this would leave the specification of F relatively. useless. In fact, we 
would merely have a description of the state changes of the system S. 
Consider a transducer such as a telephone receiver that takes 
electrical power and produces compression waves in the surrounding 
air. If we notice regularities on the compression-wave side that co-
vary with regularities on the electrical side (e.g., respective frequen-
cies), we can describe the transducer as computing the function T: 
T: (specification of electrical regularities)~ (specification 
of compression-wave regularities) 
,However, interpreting T's input and output (or, what is the same: 
producing another function T*) not only gives us a better under-
standing of what the transducer does, but an understanding that is 
crucially different from the specification of T above. For example, if 
we interpret the electrical regularities as representing voice patterns 
and the compression waves as acoustic signals representing voice 
patterns then we will be in a position to detect errors in our transducer. 
Indeed, in general, the oqly way we can know that a certain regularity 
is an inappropriate output given a certain input is by using some 
global interpretation within which we expect the given input to 
produce an output other than what it did. Take an extreme example. If 
our transducer outputs an acoustic signal corresponding to 'goodbye' 
every time it received an electrical signal corresponding to 'hello', this 
would be an error (i.e., unwanted). But we could recognize stich an 
error only if we had interpreted the corresponding physical regulari-
ties. 11 
Once F has been specified, the analy~is of F into the sequence 
(8t, ... ,gn) is possible. Here is where semantic attribution has its 
greatest payoff. The analysis of F is a real step forward when. we 
antecedently understand the individual 8i'S. This and the cor-
respondence between the states S can pass through and the g; 's is what 
gives the explanation of S's state changes as the computation of Fits 
power, for· it is this analysis that .connects S's state changes with 
something we understand, viz., the gi'S.12 
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When S passes from state Sj to Sj, function gi is computed and its 
output is then input for succeeding function gj. We understand S's 
state transition from Sj to Sj by seeing the transition as the execution of 
Ri' Doing this is interpreting the states of S because it is treating the 
states of S as symbols which get transformed. When we do this, we see 
S not merely as a physical system, but as an illterpreled virtual 
machine, i.e., as a system S* that computes F by passing through a 
sequence of virtual states which are the inputs and outputs of the gj'S 
(see Figure 1 ).13 Once we can view S as an interpreted virtual 
machine. we can switch between this view and the physical state 
transition view. At this stage, the computational strategy is complete, 
and we have our explanation of what S does and how it does it (see 
Cummins 1983, p. 39). 
The correspondence between the S's states and the gi'S can be made 
precise. On the assumption that S computes F by computing 
gn 0 gn-I o· • ·0 g. we can provde an 'interpretation function' that maps 
states of S onto the gi'S. Letting I represent the interpretation func-
tion, then we get the following picture (see Stabler 1983, and Pylshyn 
1984, pp. 54-59).14 
Interpreted g. 
virtual l(s.) J l(s2) ---+J ... 
machine S* 
II II 
system S SI J S2 ---+) ... J S,. 
Figure 1. Interpreting the state transitions of S as computing the sequence of functions 
(g., ... , g,.). 
B. An Illustration of SemQntic Attribution using the 
Computational Strategy . 
The use of the computational strategy is good scientific procedure~ A 
concrete example that exhibits this is perhaps useful at this point. 
Consider something very different from us: an ordinary, four-function 
calculator, a device that can add, subtract, ~ultiply, and divide. For 
our purposes, assume that we are given a four-function. calculator 
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which uses a brand new architecture, and that our task is to figure out 
what this new architecture is.IS 
When we test the new calculator, we notice that it sometimes seems 
to add, subtract, multiply, and divide, and that sometimes it does 
nothing. Further experimentation reveals that the order of the inputs 
makes a difference. If we input "2 + 2", the calculator does nothing 
(other than echo the final "2"). But if we input "22 + ", the calculator 
outputs "4". We hypothesize that, for the four,two-argument arith-
metical operations, the operation must be specified last. We generalize 
this, and hypothesize that the operation must always be input last. To 
test this we input "1 2 3 4 +". The calculator outputs "7", which 
doesn't accord with our prediction. The calculator seems to only 
"remember" the last two numbers input. Perhaps it can only accept 
two numbers at a time, with the operation last, for example we observe 
that, "12+34+" outputs first "3" then "7". However, as we con-
tinue experimenting with different orders of input, we discover that 
"1 2 + 3 + 4 +" gives the output" 1 0". We interpret this behavior this 
way. All four operations only accept two numbers at a time. However, 
the result of an operation is somehow 'remembered', and is used as 
one of the arguments for succeeding operations, provided that it is not 
'forgotten' which happens if more than one number is input next. 
This initial explanation, we may imagine,· stands up against further 
. tests. Now, how are we going to explain ho~ our calculator works? 
Why does the input have to have the argument and operations in the 
order that it does (post-fix order as opposed to the more natural infix 
form)? Specifically, we want to explain the way our calculator seems to 
'remember' and 'forget' numbers, and that when it gives the output we 
want it seems to 'remember' two numbers, operate on them, and 
'remember' the result, which can then be used as one of the arguments 
for the very next operation. 
Naturally enough, we hypothesize an internal representation that 
stores the inputs in a certain way, and we hypothesize that the 
calcid.ator executes an algorithm that must have its information stored 
that way. There is a data structure that nicely fits our needs: the stack. 
Our hypothesis, then, is that our calculator is a stack-based machine, 
i.e., our calculator uses a stack as its primary data structure.16 
Stacks have two associated operations: push and pop. Data items 
are pushed onto the stack as they are stored, and popped off from the 
'top' of the stack as they are used. We hypothesize that our calculator 
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pushes numbers onto its stack as they are input, and pops them when 
an operation is input. If "22+" is the input, the first "2" is pushed 
onto the stack, then the second "2" is pushed. When "+" is received, 
the two "2'''s are popped off the stack, added together, and "4" is 
pushed back onto the stack. 
Here is how the calculator works if we input "1.2 + 3 + 4 + ". Let T 
be the stack in the calculator, and assume that T = (), i.e., assume that 
T is empty at the beginning of the computation. First, "1" and "2" 
are pushed onto the stack in the order in which they are received. 
Now T = (2 1). (Note that the top of the stack is on the left.) Next, 
"+" is input. Now "1" and "2" are popped off the stack, added, and 
the result is pushed back on the stack. Now, T = (3). Next, "3" is 
received as input. Now· T = (3 3); Next, "+" is received. The two 
"3" 's are popped, added, and "6" is pushed onto the stack. T = (6). 
When "4" and "+" are received the same thing happens, with the 
result that finally T = (10). If we assume that whatever is on the top of 
the stack is also displayed as output, then 10 is displayed, and we have 
our explanation of why the order of input to our calculator has to be 
the way that it does. 17 
Compare the features of this example with the definition of the 
computational strategy given above. First, we assumed that the cal-
culator added. (This is indeed an assumption because we could have 
assumed that the infix "2 + 2 = null" was the interesting function 
rather than the post-fix "22+ == 4". This assumption is dependent on 
the context that in our culture calculators are used to compute 
(instances of) functions like addition, not functions that map inputs 
onto the null set.) Second, we explained how the calculator added by 
analyzing its addition into a series of antecedently understood stack 
operations (involving push and pop). Third, our explanation requires a 
correspondence between states of the calculator and states of the 
stack. We interpreted (a subset of) the stat~s of the calculator as being 
states of the stack. We also interpreted changes in the stack as 
computations of the functions push and pop. Both of these steps 
essentially involved semantic attribution, and both were essential to 
understanding ·what our calculator did and how it did it. Finally, the 
success .of our explanation, i.e., its utility, vindicated our original 
assumptIon that the calculator added. . 
. I am ~ow in a· position to present an argument that positing and 
mterpretmg structures and processes is necessary if an explanation is 
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to be a computational explanation. A process is a computation if it is 
usefully described as computing a fl!nction F, i.e., if over time, the 
process generates output equal to F(input). But, in order to see a 
certain process as computing a function F, we must interpret the 
initial state of the process (or system) as being the requisite input for 
F, and the final state of the process as being the requisite output, 
namely F(input). 
c. The Computational Strategy as a Strategy for Semantic Attribution 
It is worth emphasizing the main points so far. First, the goal of the 
computational strategy is ascribing the computation of a certain 
function·F to a certain system, S. Second, in order to do this one must 
interpret statesof S as entities over which F (and each of the g;'s) is 
defined. That is, we cahnot understand state transitions of a system as 
adding 1 and. 2 unless we are prepared to interpret states of S as 
representing 1 and 2.18 
Though similar points have been made before (see Cummins 1983, 
Smith 1982), they have not been seen as constituting a strategy for 
semantic attribution. Furthermore, the consequences of using this 
strategy have· not been appreciated. The first consequence is that 
though attributions of semantic content do depend on the context in 
which the attributions are made, the contexts are completely in-
dependent of any similarity measures between subjects and theorists. 
For example, if an aboriginal tribe found a calculator in the desert and 
did not understand addition, then they would devise theories of· it that 
differed significantly from ones we would devise. Such context 
dependence relativizes our scientific explanations to our goals and 
views of the world. This· is not methodologically suspect as Stich 
suggests (1983, footnote p. 139); it is merely a feature of scientific 
explanation. It is hard to imagine· a methodology that could do 
othe~ise. Indeed, this sort of context dependence appears in all our 
sciences. Even in physics, explanatory goals affect theories: if we 
wanted to, we could describe the earth as b~ing at the center of the 
solar system with all the planets revolving around it in epicycles of 
perfect circles. Moreover, if we observe the practices of theorists in 
the computational and cognitive sciences, we see that the com-
putational strate~y is used successfully relative to our goals (see 
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Cummins, 1983; Haugeland, 1981; Smith, 1982; Wulf, 1981, esp. 
Chap. 5 and part 2; and Stoy 1977). 
The second co~sequence of using the computational strategy is that 
there are no arbitrary or extra-theoretical restrictions placed on the 
contcnt~ that can be attributed. The only general requirement is that 
the ~t~nhutcd c(~~tents explain observed behavior an~ hypothesized 
cognitive capaCities. For example, causal connections underlying 
reference have no role in the computational strategy, but not because 
such connections are incompatible with semantic attribution. Rather, 
such connections are not useful for explaining cognition. Whereas, on 
the .causal strategy, we had to pick between attributing contents or· 
havmg ("scientifi~") explanations, using the computational strategy 
allows us. to attribute contents in an explanatorily useful way. For 
example, m the case of my duplicate and I, both of us have thoughts 
about my great grandmother. Presumably, only I ·was causally related 
to her, but that is not important as far as scientific explanation is 
concerned. What is important is which function we are computing, 
and hence the (attributed) contents of our states. Since my duplicate 
and I compute the same function, the content of our states must be 
identical. 19 
. Sin~e referential causal connections are not important to the com-
putational strategy, we can simply avoid such issues as what the 
causally corr~ct. referent of a referring term is, while respecting the 
autonomy prmclple. The computational strategy allows us to attribute 
contents. and fix referents in a way that is relevant to psychological 
explanation because contents are assigned on the basis of what 
~xplains the current physical, computational· state of the system: this 
IS what the function I does.20 . 
This bring~ u~ to the !hird consequence. In the computational 
strategy, attnbutmg a partIcular content to a particular mental state 
(or state of the system) is not paramount, as it is 'for example in the 
causal strategy. The computational strategist wants to understand 
systems. Semantic contents are thus viewed in the context of entire 
systems. On the computational strategy, no mental state, indeed no 
symbol whatsoever, is (usefully) interpreted in isolation. Rather, whole 
systems of states. must. be as~ribe~ co~tents so that a cogent explana-
tIOn results. In dlscussmg thiS pomt with respect to ciphers, Cummins 
says: 
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In a cipher any numeral can, taken independently of the others. be assigned any 
significance whatever. It is only a definite context which places any constraint on the 
significance 10 be assigned to an individual numeral. the requirement being that when 
each numeral is assigned a meaning by a determinate rule, a coherent message should 
result. (1983. p. 37) 
The fourth consequence is that attributing semantics via the com-
putational strategy is not a folk art. One must be intimate with the 
systems under study in order to attribute contents that are scientifically 
useful. This is just another way of saying that understanding and 
attribution are achieved concommitantly. 
Finally, the view that computational explanations essentially involve 
semantic attribution has two major consequences. First, it entails that 
if psychology is to embrace the computational paradigm, it must 
ascribe contents to mental states and processes because ascribing 
contents is necessary for understanding which function is being com-
puted by the psychological processes in question, and understanding 
this· is necessary for understanding the behavioral and psychological 
capacities of the system. Second, it entails that computers cannot be 
understood as merely formal symbol manipulators. In the next section, 
I will defend this latter claim . 
4. 
Most philosophers· view computers as formal symbol manipulators. A 
formal symbol manipulator· is a syntax machine, performing the 
actions it does on the basis of the syntactic properties of the symbols it. 
manipulates, rather than. on the basis of what the symbols symboliZe. 
This view of computers _has allowed some philosophers to divorce 
semantics from computational explanations. Semantic content, then, 
becomes something one adds to computational explanations to get 
psychological explanations (see Haugeland, 1981; and Pylyshyn, 
1984). Other philosophers, such as Stich (1983), take the more radical 
view that semantics is completely otiose. If I can at least raise some 
doubts that computers are or can be understood as formal symbol 
manipulators, then this basis for current anti-semantic sentiments will 
be weakened. 
The importance of semantically interpreting structures and proces-
ses in computational. explanations is well known to computer scientists. 
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The field of denotational semantics is an example of the study of the 
semantics of computational processes. In denotational semantics, 
computer scientists study the semantics of programming languages 
(see, e.g., Stoy, 1977). This approach to semantics involves providing 
valuation functions for the syntactic constructs of a programming 
language which are used to write programs in that language. The 
valuation functions map the constructs onto the abstract entities tpey 
denote: numbers, truth values, data structures, etc. The important 
point for our purposes is to note that the mapping is designed in such a 
way that behavior of the constructs is explained by the behavior of the 
abstract entities, whiclJ can be studied independently. Since any pro-
gram is made up of syntactic constructs of a given programming 
language, explaining the constructs is necessary for explaining what 
the program does, or, said another way, explaining the behavior of the 
virtual machine the program instantiates.2l Within denotational 
semantics, therefore, machines are thought of both formally and 
semantically. This is an important point: for computer scientists, 
semantics is not something that is informal or essentially dependent on 
folk notions. 
Semantically interpreting processes and structures using, the com-
putational strategy is more ~han a field .of study within computer 
science, however. Brian Smith has argued that explanatory semantic 
attribution lies at the core of the notion of computation (Smith, 1982). 
In 'Semantic Attribution and the Formality Condition' (1982), Smith 
says " ... what distinguishes an abacus, a calculator, and even a full 
scale computer, from other rule-governed complex artifacts like steam 
plants and food processors, is that the best explanation of [their] 
behavior is formulated in the domain of interpretation, not in the 
domain of the uninterpreted signs ... [Smith's emphasis]". He goes on· 
to say: "The more complex the computer, the more important the 
interpreted account becomes to our understanding, and the more 
variegated the kinds of interpretation: once you move past simple 
calculating devices into full programming languages, you find not just 
simple names, but quotation and internal reference, complex function 
designators, and even intensional contexts". Thus, on Smith's view of 
computation, something is a computer just in case we are required to 
semantically interpret its input/output behavior, its structures, and its 
internal processes in an effort to explain its most salient capacities. His 
own summary of this view is this: "Computers ... are ... just those 
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devices whose functional architecture we understand in terms of external 
semantical attribution [Smith's emphasis)". 
Though Smith's view has not achieved the status of receiv~d doc-
trine within computer science, it is fair to say that he has articulated 
what many computer scientists have long believed: interpreting the 
constituents of a process as standing for or representing other things is 
essential to understanding that process as a computation.22 Using the 
language from Section 3, if we can usefully view a system as an 
interpreted virtual machine, it is a computer. . 
So far, my argument has been ·epistemological'. I have argued that 
in order to understand computers (i.e., in order to know what they are 
doing), we must view them as interpreted virtual m~chines. In some 
sense, a computer might be a formal symbol mampulator, but we 
could never understand it as such. Unless we attribute contents to the 
computer's processing we could never build one nor could we ever 
debug one (recall·the discussion of the transducer in Section 3).23 
To me, the epistemological argument is compelling. Worries ab~ut 
whether computers are really formal symbol manipulators seem beSide 
the point: to understand them, we must view them as seman.tic 
engines. However, I think an argument c'an be made that, 10-
dependently of our understanding them, computers are not formal 
symbol manipulators. 
In the obvious sense of the term, to manipulate symbols in a purely 
formal manner is to manipulate them without regard to what they refer 
to, mean, or denote. This means that the manipUlations must not 
depend on a symbol having a meaning or denotation. For example, 
manipulating a symbol solely in virtue of whether it is a token of some 
numeral, letter, or part of speech is one way to treat a symbol purely 
formally. If this is correct, then computers are not formal symbol 
manipulators. 
Consider the notion of a variable in this instance of the Lisp 
function "+": 
(+ xl). 
Loosely speaking, this function adds 1 to whatever x is ~ound to. 
However for this argument, it is important that we be precise about 
what the entities under discussion are. A computer running a Lisp 
interpreter (the Lisp execution program) defines a virtual machine v:e 
will call a Lisp virtual machine (L VM). An L VM operates solely 10 
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terms of Lisp expressions, the syntax for which can be specified by a 
grammar. (I will mention Lisp expressions by placing single quotes 
around them. The. primary reason for couching the argument in t~rms 
of an LVM is that it will be easier to understand. Nothing turns on 
this .. The same argument could be made at the bit level, though at this 
level the argument would be all but lost in the detail. 24) 
An LVM takes as input expressions such as '(+ xl)', evaluates 
them, and returns expressions as outputs. We interpret the inputs, 
outputs. and intermediate expressions as, for example, computing an 
instance of the function plus, and producing the number 7 as its value. 
We also attribute the content of representing the number 1 to Lisp 
expressions such as '1'. These interpretations are enhanced by making 
the syntactic form of the Lisp expressions look like expression in 
languages we already know. 
A particular L YM evaluating the expression '( + x·}), is required to 
look up the value of the variable 'x', which is some other Lisp 
expression, let us say '6'. If the LYM could not perform this look-up, 
the expression would be syntactically ill-formed: '+' is not defined for 
expressions we interpret as non-variable letters. But now notice, the 
L YM itself in treating' x' as a variable, is treating' x' as denoting the 
expression '6'. It follows from this that the LYM treats 'x' as having a 
meaning. Hence, the operation of the L YM depends on 'x' having a 
meaning for the LVM, not just for us. Of course, the meaning 'x' has 
for the LVM (viz. '6') is not the meaning' x' has for us (we typically 
interpret 'x' as representing the number 6, not the Lisp expression '6'). 
Indeed, '(+ x 1)' means something different to us than it does to the 
L VM. Nevertheless, the L VM's manipulations depend on the fact that 
'x' has a meaning (and indeed, on the meaning it has). This is enough 
to render false the claim that computers are formal symbol manipula-
tors, at least on the straightforward interpretation of this claim I have 
assumed. (This same result appears to follow assuming a causal theory 
of reference. When a computer internally fixes the binding of a 
variable, it is determining the referent of that variable causally.) 
I suspect that the notion of a formal symbol manipulator is a 
hodgepodge of other notions and intuitions, some of which we want to 
maintain. For example, in a very interesting paper, Haugeland (1979), 
argues that computers will not succeed in understanding natural 
language until they can be given (or otherwise develop) a sense of the 
world they inhabit, the creatures they interact with, and, most im-
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portantly, a sense of themselves as enduring. wholes. Those. that think 
computers are merely formal symbol mampulators may In fact be 
noticing that computers are not 'understanders', at least not today. 
Another way of stating my point, then, is though computers may not 
be understanders, they are not merely formal symbol manipulators. 
5. CONCLUSION 
I have shown, I believe, that computers are not formal symbol 
manipulators. But whether they are or not, our understanding of 
computers inescapably involves attributing semantics to. their proces-
ses. Moreover, I have argued that, in general, computational explana-
tions, either of humans or computers, crucially involve attributing 
semantic contents. If we are going to utilize computational explana-
tions in our psychological theories, then our psychological theories 
will crucially involve semantic content.25 
NOTES 
I Fodor, for example, wishes to explain propositional attitudes in terms of oper~lions 
defined over mental representations (Fodor, 1915, 1981). He also wants to explam the 
intentionality of propositional attitudes, their semantic properties, in virtue of mental 
representations (Fodor, 1981 and 1984b). Obviously, if a mature cognitive science doc:s 
nol countenance propositional attitudes and mental representations, Fodor's program IS 
doomed. 
2 Computationalism is the theoretical and methodological backbone of modem cog-
nitive psychology in the sense that some of our best theories are explicitly computa~onal 
(see Fodor, 1915, Cummins 1983, and PyIyshyn 1984). There are computational 
theories of language processing and language acquisition (e.g., Fodor, Bever, and 
Garrett 1914, and Anderson 1916), learning (e.g., Anderson 19~6, 1983), imagery (e.g., 
Pylyshyn 1984, and Block 1981), memory (e.g., Norman and Rumelhart 1915, Ander-
son 1916, 1983), problem solving (e.g., NeweU and Simon 1912), cognitive develop-
ment (e.g., Moore 1913), and vision (Marr 1982). . . 
3 Rejecting the formal symbol manipulator view of computers will also have far-rangmg 
affects. For example, Searle's (1980) argument that computers aren't intentional, 
Fodor's (1980) argument for adopting methodological soli~ism as a research strategy in 
cognitive psychology, and Dretske's (1985) argument that computers can't add (let. 
alone think) will all be undermined since they all rest on this view of computers. 
.. Stich uses both of these problems in arguing that cognitive psychologists ought to 
reject the notion of belief (1983). 
S An essential part of Stich's theory is attributing content to ourselves. Notice that this 
cannot invoive any sort of empathic comparison. Though he doesn't explicitly say, 
apparently we can attribute content to ourselves merely by introspecting, discovering 
.4 
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which contents are 'there', and attributing those to ourselves. In any case, I am going to 
assume that introspection is involved when we attribute content to ourselves. 
() Stich does not think that these similarity judgments arc consciously a part of content 
ascription; rather, the judgments are made unconsciously (1982). 
7 Fodor (1980) has advocated a like principle called 'methodological solipsism' a term 
Putnam coined for the 'assumption that no psychological state, properly so-called, 
presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom the state is 
ascribed' (Putnam, 1975). 
II The causal strategy is not a folk strategy. It is a theory-driven strategy hecaus~ 
contents are attributed in accordance with referents specified by the underlying theory 
of reference. Moreover, the causal strategy is regarded by many as being at least 
partially correct. Stich endorses it (see 1983, pp. 60ff, 89ff, and 165). See also, Kripke 
(1972), Putnam (1975), Devitt (1981), Dretske (1981), Fodor (1984). 
OJ Though the failure of the two strategies is not sufficient for claiming that scientific 
psychology is incompatible with ascribing semantics, this claim can be bolstered by 
developing a semantic-free methodology for psychology. This is the strategy Stich 
attempts with his syntactic theory of mind (1983). 
10 In computer science, the sequence of g; 's are typically expressed in some general 
formal language like the lambda calculus or in a programming language like Lisp. The 
sequence of gi'S constitute an algorithm expressed in the formal language. For com-
pleteness, note that in the degenerate case, F = 8k for some (I :s;; k :s;; n), and that all the 
other g; 's are the identity function, i.e.; the "do nothing" function. 
11 Of course, we can detect errors in devices such as transducers at the regularity level 
if the manufacturer tells us what the T should be, but this is completely artifactual: we 
don't have manufacturer's specifications for our eyes, for example. For natural trans-
ducers, we must interpret the given physical regularities, e.g., interpreting neuronal 
activity as representing edges, shadows, or locations of color patches. See Marr (1982). 
12 What understanding a function amounts to is also something that eludes cognitive 
scientists. It surely has something to do with knowing how to use it, how to recognize it, 
and how to transform it. In this regard, understanding a function is similar to under-
standing a natural language sentence. Presumably, all types of understanding are similar 
a·nd will be subsumed under one theory; until we have a much more robust theory of the 
mind, however, we are going to have to be content with couching understanding-in 
terms of use. . 
13 For an introduction to the notion of a virtual machine, see Tanenbaum (1984). 
14 In computer science, I is the composition of two fUnctions (I = 12 0 / 1). It is I. that aUow~ us ~o .see the state transitions of S as causally related and law-like. In physics, a 
function SimIlar to I. allows us to see S's state transitions as being governed by physical 
(transition) laws (see Cummins 1983, esp. pp. 1-2). However, in computer science, I. 
maps states of S onto objects (or states) that are themselves interpreted, i.e., II maps the 
states of S onto instructions in some programming language. I. is realized by engineers 
who design computers, beginning with those who design computer chips and ending 
with those who design operating systems and applications software. 12 picks up where II 
leaves off, providing a further interpretation of the states of S. 12 is provided by a 
denotational semantics which provides semantic valuation functions mapping syntactic 
constructs in the programming language onto the abstract values they denote (see Stoy 
1977, and Pylyshyn 1984, pp. 59-62). 
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IS This is sometimes called 'reverse engineering'. It is a procedure used in industrial 
espionage. 
16 Data structures are methods for organizing information inside a computer. A stack is 
merely a kind of data structure where individual items of information are added to or 
deleted from only one end of the stack called its 'top'. A stack of dinner plates works 
like a stack data structure: plates are added to the top of the stack when stored, and they 
are removed from the top when they are needed. 
17 This is not a complete explanation of how our calculator works; there are, for 
example, other data structures that are involved when the calculator actually adds 
(subtracts, etc;) the two numbers from the stack. A complete explanation would also 
include an account of how the calculator's hardware supports the computational 
explanation involving data structures and processes. Explanations at the hardware level 
still require semantic attribution. A good example of this sort of enterprise is provided in 
the appendix to Cummins (1983). 
IN his possible to describe systems (such as our calculator) at the micro-component 
level. Yet as ·noted in Note 17, even at this level, components are interpreted as 
computing functions, and inputs and outputs to these components are interpreted as 
either numbers or truth values. So even at the microcomponent level, semantic 
interpretation is crucial. I will return to this point in Section 4. 
19 My duplicate and I of course do not have identical physical states; we .have similar 
physical states (because of quantum mechanical effects and the like). But this difference 
will only make a difference when our behaviors become divergent enough to warrant 
assigning different functions to our cognitive processes. 
Notice by the way that the causal strategy may not be as bad as Stich claims. The 
causal relations between my duplicate and I (the ones figuring in the construction of my 
duplicate) are important to (and may be sufficient for) attributing thoughts about my 
great-grandmother to my duplicate. 
20 Care must be taken here not to think of physical states as states described in one of 
the languages of physics such as quantum mechanics, for at this level there aren't any 
computers, or any computational devices whatsoever. There are only state transitions 
and probabilities assigned to the state transitions. No functions get computed by any 
system described at this level unless one is willing to see, e.g., clusters of particles as 
numbers, but of course if one does this, one is interpreting state transitions. 
21 There are other methods of studying the semantics of programming languages, (for a 
good introduction see Wulf, et al., 1981). Note the similarity between denotational 
semantics and model theory. Valuation functions in denotational semantics resemble 
valulation functions in logic that assign terms in a formal language L to an inter-
pretation of L. 
22 Smith no longer believes that the semantic properties of computers are merely 
attributed. On his new view, computers are not formal symbol manipulators, in any 
sense of this phrase. Thus his view now is stronger than the one he espouses in his 1982 
paper (personal communication). 
23 Two colleagues of mine were recently testing and debugging an English language 
parser. The parser produced incorrect parses for sentences such as "The best in-
gredients for pizza are ground beef and onions". The error turned out to be that the 
parser took ·beef' to be one conjugation of the verb Uto be". In diagnosing and 
repairing this bug the content ubeef is related to the verb 'to be'" was actually 
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attributed to the parser. This attribution was crucial to finding and fixing the bug. 
24 Sometimes the bit level description of computers is thought to be the 'real' level of 
description. often because the bit level is thought to be the level of causal interactions. 
This is completely mistaken. First, causal interactions can be and are described as 
occurring at many different levels, e.g .• the Lisp level. Second, bits are as symbolic as 
Lisp expressions. 
25 This paper has benefitted greatly from the comments of an anonymous reviewer -
thank you. I also thank Chris Fields, Robin Hill, Alan Strudler, Dan Fass .• and Jordan 
Pollack for invaluable discussions on the various philosophical and computational issues 
I've raised here, and Stephen Stich, Robert Cummins, Mike Harnish. and Myles Brand 
for commenting on earlier versions of this paper. 
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